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Dr. John C. Hopkins, former Director of the Los Alamos Nuclear Weapons Program, offers a guest
lecture on the role of nuclear weapons in World War II in Glasgow Hall, Feb. 8. The free-flowing
discussion offered attendees the opportunity to re-examine the effectiveness of atomic weapons in
the closing days of the second World War, leading to Japan’s ultimate surrender. 
 
“As the years go by, the rhetoric of revisionism and conspiracy theory confuse the rationale for the
use of nuclear weapons in WWII,” said Hopkins. “In my view, the original explanation for the
nuclear strikes is most compelling. I will focus today on the events leading up to the two nuclear
strikes on Japan in August 1945, and the Japanese Supreme War Counsel reaction to the use of
nuclear weapons.” 
 
Hopkins continued his lecture by posing a question to the audience ... Was Japan ready to
surrender in the summer of 1945? At the time, research has shown that some in the Japanese
Foreign Office wanted to consider an armistice, not a surrender, which was to be mediated by the
Soviet Union, he explained. 
 
“The Japanese hoped for better terms at the peace table, not necessarily to win the war,” said
Hopkins. 
 
Neither an armistice nor surrender had occurred, and the decision to exercise a nuclear strike was











made, with the first weapon detonated over Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945, followed by Nagasaki on
Aug. 9. 
 
Attendees posed several questions revolving around the decision to employ these weapons and
Japan’s eventual surrender on Aug. 15. Was three days between each nuclear strike enough time
for Japan to surrender? Was the Soviet Union’s invasion and declaration of war a motivating
concern for Japan to surrender in order to maintain their territory? Was the perception of Japan’s
surrender different after the nuclear strikes because of a now clear technological disadvantage
versus a loss of will to fight? 
 
In closing, Perkins offered a closing perspective on the ultimate question with regard to the use of
nuclear weapons in WWII, morality. 
 
“I will close with one final thought, it has to do with the perceived morality of the use of nuclear
weapons during WWII,” he said. “I have heard and seen reports of Oppenheimer’s misgivings
about the use of nuclear weapons against Japan. As far as I can tell he did not have any regrets,
either at the time of the nuclear strikes or later. When David Bohm wrote to him in December of
1966 asking whether he felt any regret over the bombing of Hiroshima, Oppenheimer wrote back,
‘My own feelings about responsibility and guilt have always had to do with the present, and so far,
in this life, that had been more than enough to occupy me.’”
 
